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On Thursday February 21, 2013 57-year-old Newfoundland and 
Labrador Fish & Wildlife Officer Howard Lavers drowned after his 
snowmobile broke through pond ice near Blue Mountain. He and two 
other officers were patrolling  the area when the ice broke and all three 
officers fell into the water. The other two officers were able to get back 
onto the ice but were unable to rescue Officer Lavers from the water. 
An RCMP dive team recovered Officer Lavers' body the following 
day.Officer Lavers had served with the agency for 30 years.
On Saturday March 2, 2013 27-year-old Kativik Regional Police Force 
Constable Steve Dery was shot and killed after he and another constable 
responded to a domestic violence call in Kuujjuaq, Quebec, at about 9:30 
pm. The male subject opened fire on both constables as they exited their 
patrol car, fatally wounding  Constable Dery and wounding  the other 
constable.
On Thursday March 14, 2013 26-year-old Guelph Police Service 
Constable Jennifer Kovach was killed when her patrol car collided with 
a transit bus shortly after 12:30 am. She was responding  to assist at 
another call when her patrol car crossed the center line and collided 
with the bus. She was transported to Guelph General Hospital where 
she succumbed to her injuries.
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
“They Are Our Heroes. We Shall Not Forget Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Bully proof [videorecording]: classroom confidential.
Toronto, ON: Canadian Broadcasting  Corporation, 
[2012] : CBC Learning [distributor]
1 videodisc (ca. 45 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
Originally broadcast as part of the CBC television 
series Connect with Mark Kelley on June 2, 2012.
Special features: additional interviews: Are bullies 
and victims so different? (Christina); After the bell 
(Kahlan); Bullying  online (Shaheen Shariff); Legacy 
of bullying  (John Amaechi); Sticks & stones (Emily 
Bazelon).
One in three Canadian students from grade 7 to 12 
are victims of bullying. The numbers speak for 
themselves, but who are the faces behind the 
statistics? While on location at a Quebec high 
school [Hadley Junior High School/Philemon Wright 
High School], the Connect team sets up a “Bully 
Booth” where students and teachers privately share 
their personal experiences with bullying.
LB 3013.34 C3 B858 2012 D1543
Conflicts in the workplace [videorecording]:  sources 
& solutions.
Kantola Productions.
Mill Valley, CA: Kantola Productions, c2010.
1 videodisc (17 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
There will always be conflict in the workplace. The 
secret is learning  to manage it successfully. This 
program acknowledges common sources of  
workplace conflicts, and then explains specific 
techniques for resolving them.
HD 42 C68 2010 D1545
Diversity, culture and counselling:  a Canadian 
perspective.
Honoré France, María del Carmen Rodríguez, 
Geoffrey Hett.
Calgary, AB: Brush Education, c2013.
BF 637 C6 F723 2013
Engage: the trainer's guide to learning styles.
Jeanine O'Neill-Blackwell.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, c2012.
LB 1027.47 O64 2012
Interviewing  as qualitative research:  a guide for 
researchers in education and the social sciences.
Irving Seidman.
New York, NY: Teachers College Press, c2013.
H 61.28 S45 2013
Jolts!: activities to wake up and engage your 
participants.
Sivasailam "Thiagi" Thiagarajan, Tracy Tagliati.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, c2011.
The landscape of qualitative research.
editors, Norman K. Denzin, University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, Yvonna S. Lincoln, Texas A&M 
University.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013.
H 62 L274 2013
Making  the brain/body connection:  a playful 
guide to releasing  mental, physical & emotional 
blocks to success.
Sharon Promislow; illustrations by Cathrine Levan.
Vancouver, BC: Enhanced Learning  and Integration, 
Inc., c2005.
BF 161 P75 2005
The new supervisor: lead with confidence.
Wil McKnight and Elwood N. Chapman.
Rochester, NY: Azxo Press, c2010.
HF 5549.12 C438 2010
Office ergonomics safety guide.
Hamilton, ON: Canadian Centre for Occupational 
Health and Safety, 2011.
TA 166 O43 2011
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Presentation zen: simple ideas on presentation 
design and delivery.
Garr Reynolds.
Berkeley, CA: New Riders, c2012.
HF 5718.22 R49 2012
Racism in Canada.
Vic Satzewich.
Don Mills, ON; New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, c2011.
FC 104 S289 2011
The secrets of facilitation:  the SMART guide to 
getting results with groups.
Michael Wilkinson.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
HM 751 W557 2012
Social research  method:  qualitative and 
quantitative approaches.
H. Russell Bernard.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, c2013.
H 62 B439 2013
Surviving  survival:  the art and science of 
resilience.
Laurence Gonzales.
New York, NY: W.W. Norton, c2012.
BF 698.35 R47 G66 2012
The winning factor:  inspire gold-medal 
performance in your employees.
Peter Jensen.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
c2012.
HF 5549.5 C53 J46 2012
Work it out: using  personality type to improve 
team performance.
Sandra Krebs Hirsh & Jane A.G. Kise.
Mountain View, CA: Davies-Black Pub., c2006.
HD 42 H57 2006
Writing exceptional policies and procedures. 
Stephen B. Page.
Westerville, OH: S. Page/Process Improvement Pub., 
c2009.
HF 5718.3 P3445 2009
CELLPHONE SEARCH UPON 
ARREST OK
R. v. Fearon, 2013 ONCA 106
A flea market jewellery stall operator 
was packing  her merchandise into 
her car when she was robbed by two 
men, one of them pointing  a 
handgun. The men grabbed the 
jewellery, valued between $10,000 and $40,000, 
and fled.  Based on a description provided by a 
witness, police suspected the accused may have 
been involved. He was subsequently arrested for 
robbery while armed with a firearm, cautioned and 
advised of his right to counsel. When patted down 
police located a cellphone. An officer turned it “on”, 
manipulated its key pad and discovered photographs 
of a gun and cash as well as an incriminating  draft 
text message which read, “We did it were the 
jewlery at nigga burrrrrrrrr”. At the police station the 
draft text message was saved and, as the 
investigation progressed, additional checks of the 
phone were made throughout the night and the next 
morning. In the lead investigator’s experience, 
cellphones found in similar circumstances contain 
text messages sent between co-accuseds that would 
assist police in recovering  stolen property and 
apprehending  suspects. Many months later, an 
officer involved in the investigation believed that a 
search warrant was required to download the 
contents of the cellphone and therefore applied for 
and obtained a warrant to re-examine the phone for 
the photos and text message. The accused was 
charged with armed robbery and several related 
offences.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused contended that the search of 
his cellphone and the retrieval of the 
photographs and text message exceeded 
the search incident to arrest power, 
breaching  s. 8  of the Charter and rendering  the 
evidence inadmissible under s. 24(2). In his opinion, 
the expectation of privacy in the contents of a 
cellphone is so high that a warrant is required before 
its contents can be examined.  The judge, however, 
disagreed. In her view both the search at the scene 
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of the arrest and later at the police station were 
lawful. She found that there was a reasonable 
prospect of securing  evidence related to the offence 
for which the accused was arrested. It was 
reasonable for the investigator to believe that the 
accused may have been communicating  through the 
cellphone before, during  or after the robbery with 
other perpetrators or with third parties. The search at 
the arrest scene was brief and cursory and there was 
no suggestion that it was an expansive or abusive 
search. 
As for the searches of the cellphone during  the night 
and early morning  hours of the next day, they too 
were lawful as an incident to arrest.  “Although 
considerable time and distance had passed from the 
search at the scene, it was not significant because 
the searches of the cellphone phone at the station 
were closely connected to the search at the scene,” 
she said.  “The searches at the station were 
essentially an extension of the search at the scene.” 
In this case, the judge ruled that “the information 
stored is not so connected to the dignity of the 
person that this court should create an exception to 
the police ability to search for evidence when truly 
incidental to arrest and carried out in a reasonable 
manner.” She also considered s. 24(2) in the event 
she was wrong  in her s. 8 analysis and would have 
admitted the evidence anyway. The accused was 
convicted of robbery and was sentenced to six years 
in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again submitted that 
the search of the cellphone was not 
lawfully conducted as an incident 
to his arrest and infringed his s. 8 
rights.  He argued that there should be a cellphone 
exception to the doctrine of search incident to 
arrest.  In his view, the warrantless search of the 
contents of a cellphone incident to arrest (except for 
a cursory examination to see if it contains evidence 
of the alleged crime) is prohibited by s. 8  except in 
exigent circumstances.  He opined that the police 
should have applied for a search warrant after the 
pat down search produced the cellphone or, at the 
very least, after conducting  the cursory examination 
of its contents when the photos and text message 
were discovered.  Furthermore, he contended that 
the trial judge erred by admitting  the incriminating 
text and picture produced from the cellphone under 
s. 24(2). The Crown, on the other hand, suggested 
that cellphone examinations fall properly within the 
ambit of the common law power of search incident 
to arrest and no “exception” for cellphones ought to 
be carved out of this search doctrine. Furthermore, 
the Crown argued that the trial judge’s s. 24(2) 
analysis was correct. 
Three interveners also took positions on this issue. 
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association submitted 
that cellphones should be excluded from warrantless 
searches incident to arrest, absent exigent 
circumstances.  The Criminal Lawyers’ Association 
would permit a cursory examination of a cellphone 
to determine if it contained relevant evidence, then 
the examination should cease and a search warrant 
obtained. The Director of Public Prosecutions of 
Canada submitted that there should be no cellphone 
exception. 
Searching Incident to Arrest
For a search to be lawful as an incident to arrest 
there must be some reason related to the arrest for 
conducting  the search at the time it is carried out, 
such as protecting  police, protecting  evidence or 
discovering  evidence. The police do not need 
reasonable grounds they will find anything  but their 
reason for searching must be objectively reasonable. 
Was the belief by police that a cellphone search 
would yield evidence of the robbery reasonable?  
Justice Armstrong, writing  the Court’s unanimous 
judgment, found the trial judge did not err in 
concluding  that the police reasonably believed that 
an examination of the cellphone contents would 
yield relevant evidence:  
The [accused] was arrested about three hours 
after the robbery.  The police had information 
that the [accused] had acted with a second 
person and that a third person was involved in 
the stashing  of the stolen jewellery. There was 
therefore a potential for communication among 
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the three suspected participants. In addition, the 
police had a legitimate concern about the 
location of the gun and the stolen jewellery.  
Any communication among  the three suspects 
could lead to the discovery of one or both. In 
respect of the photographs found in the cell 
phone, the police knew from experience that 
robbers will sometimes take photos of the stolen 
property and even of themselves with the 
loot. [para. 47]
Did the cellphone search go beyond the 
permissible limits of a search incident to arrest?
Here, the Court of Appeal found the initial search 
upon arrest was valid. Justice Armstrong stated:
I cannot conclude, in the circumstances of this 
case, that the original examination of the 
contents of the cell phone fell outside the ambit 
of the common law doctrine of search incident 
to arrest. Apparently, the cell phone was turned 
“on” and it was not password protected or 
otherwise “locked” to users other than the 
[accused]. The police officers had a reasonable 
belief that they might find photographs and text 
messages relevant to the robbery.  The initial 
search at the time of the arrest involved a 
cursory look through the contents of the cell 
phone to ascertain if it contained such 
evidence. [para. 57]
The subsequent searches of the cellphone at the 
police station were more difficult for the Court to 
analyze:  
Arguably, those examinations went beyond the 
limits for a search incident to arrest. In my view, 
the proper course for the police was to stop the 
examination of the contents of the cell phone 
when they took the [accused] to the police 
station and then proceed to obtain a search 
warrant. [A detective] agreed that there was no 
urgency to search through the cell phone. There 
is no evidence that it would have been 
impracticable to appear before a justice to 
obtain a search warrant in the usual manner.  If it 
was impracticable for an officer to appear before 
a justice to obtain a search warrant, the police 
could have proceeded to obtain a telewarrant 
under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code. That said, 
the trial judge concluded that the examination of 
the contents of the cell phone at the police 
station were connected to the search at the 
scene of the arrest.  Although some time and 
distance had passed from the arrest, the trial 
judge found that the police were still looking  for 
evidence of the location of the jewellery and the 
gun as well as for contacts among the parties to 
the offences.   These were findings of fact made 
by the trial judge. While I would have come to a 
different conclusion, I cannot say that these 
factual findings reflect palpable and overriding 
error.
There is also another observation to make about 
the search of the cell phone at the police 
station. No additional evidence appears to have 
been discovered by the police and none was 
tendered in evidence from that search.   [paras. 
58-59]
In the end however, the Court of Appeal concluded 
that the trial judge did not err in finding  the 
examination of the cellphone’s contents at the time 
and place of arrest and later at the police station 
were within the ambit of the common law doctrine 
of search incident to arrest.
Carving Out An Exception
Justice Armstrong  refused to carve out a cellphone 
exception to the common law power of search 
incident to arrest, at least on the facts of this case, 
finding it neither necessary nor desirable to do so: 
In this case, it is significant that the cell phone 
was apparently not password protected or 
otherwise “locked” to users other than the 
[accused] when it was seized. Furthermore, the 
police had a reasonable belief that it would 
contain relevant evidence.  The police, in my 
view, were within the limits of Caslake to 
examine the contents of the cell phone in a 
cursory fashion to ascertain if it contained 
evidence relevant to the alleged crime.  If a 
cursory examination did not reveal any such 
evidence, then at that point the search incident 
to arrest should have ceased.
...   There was no suggestion in this case that this 
particular cell phone functioned as a “mini-
computer” nor that its contents were not 
“immediately visible to the eye”. Rather, 
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because the phone was not password protected, 
the photos and the text message were readily 
available to other users.
If the cell phone had been password protected 
or otherwise “locked” to users other than the 
[accused], it would not have been appropriate to 
take steps to open the cell phone and examine 
its contents without first obtaining  a search 
warrant. [paras. 73-75]
Even if there was a s. 8  breach, the trial judge’s s. 
24(2) analysis was not in error. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. It is worth noting  that Justice 
Armstrong  suggested that perhaps some future case 
may produce such facts that would lead the court to 
carve out a cellphone exception to the power of 
search as an incident to arrest.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OFFICER SAFETY JUSTIFIES 
CONTROLLING VEHICLE 
OCCUPANTS
R. v. Johnson, 2013 ONCA 177
Toronto Anti-violence Initiative 
Strategy (TAVIS) officers, responsible 
for providing  high-visibility uniform 
policing, saw a Chevrolet Cobalt stop 
partially in a traffic lane and partially 
on the boulevard in an area that regularly 
experienced a spike in summer violence. As the car 
left, a passenger in the backseat yelled “Southside.” 
The officers pulled the vehicle over but its driver did 
not have his G1 licence with him (a graduated 
licence requiring  he be accompanied by a fully 
licensed driver). A front passenger was not fully 
licenced. While traffic tickets for unaccompanied 
driver, failure to surrender a licence and having  no 
current licence plate tag  were being  written up for 
the driver, a second officer directed the accused (a 
rear passenger) to keep his hands on the back of the 
driver seat where he could see them. The officer was 
curious why the accused had yelled “Southside”, but 
did not ask him about it. The conversation that 
followed was cordial, polite and respectful. The 
accused identified himself, provided his date of birth 
and gave his address. A CPIC query was 
inconsequential. The officer then noticed the end of 
a gun sticking  out from a backpack on the seat next 
to the accused. The officer reached into the car, took 
the bag  and found a loaded semi-automatic 
handgun along  with other items including  an inhaler 
with the accused’s name and date of birth on it. The 
accused was arrested, given him his right to counsel 
and subsequently charged with several offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that his rights under 
ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter had been 
breached and the evidence was 
inadmissible under s. 24(2). But the trial judge 
rejected this view. He found that the car was 
lawfully stopped by police, even though they had 
two sets of interests: (1) Highway Traffic Act (HTA) 
offences and (2) curiosity as to why the accused 
yelled out “Southside”. The judge also proceeded on 
the basis that passengers are not automatically 
detained upon an HTA stop. The interaction between 
the police and the accused was cordial and brief, 
and the temporary restriction on his movements did 
not render the encounter a detention. The 
requirement that the accused put his hands on the 
top of the car seat in front of him during  this period 
of time was a routine act to protect the safety of 
officers. The judge stated:
This type of routine concern for police officer 
safety, objectively viewed, does not result in a 
finding  of detention. A reasonable person 
informed of all the circumstances would 
understand that the officer is taking a routine 
safety precaution in an area of the city that, 
according to the evidence in this case, 
historically saw a spike in violence in the 
summer months.
The extended amount of time the accused was 
required keep his hands in view was due to the time 
it took for the three HTA infractions to be 
documented. However, the CPIC check of the 
accused was an unlawful search. This search, 
however, did not turn the delay into a detention, 
result in any additional police interest in the accused 
nor lead to the finding  of the handgun. Despite the s. 
8  Charter breach, the gun was admitted as evidence 
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under s. 24(2) and the accused was convicted of 
several firearm offences and sentenced to nine years 
in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the trial 
judge’s ruling, submitting  he was detained and that 
the evidence was inadmissible. 
Was there a Detention?
Justice Epstein, writing  for himself and another 
judge, found the accused was detained when he was 
asked to put his hands on the back of the seat in 
front of him. “A person can be restrained physically 
or psychologically. Either amounts to detention,” he 
said. “If a person obeys a police command on the 
basis that he or she believes there is no alternative, 
that person is detained for the purposes of ss. 9 and 
10 of the Charter.” 
In a s ses s ing  whe ther an ind iv idua l was 
psychologically detained a court will look at the 
circumstances giving  rise to the encounter, the 
nature of the police conduct and the particular 
characteristics of the individual. In this case, Justice 
Epstein found it unnecessary to decide whether 
passengers are automatically detained upon an HTA 
stop. Instead, he concluded that the accused was 
detained when he was directed to put h i s 
hands on the seat in front of him:
Significantly, [the accused] was not 
merely asked to keep his hands 
visible; he was directed to put his 
hands on the seat in front him – in a 
fixed place.   It was clear that [the 
accused] could not obey [the officer’s] 
command to keep his hands on the seat and at 
the same time, open the car door, get out and 
walk away.   [The accused] was effectively 
instructed to stay put. [para. 39]
And further:
[V]iewed objectively, [the accused] would 
reasonably believe that he was not free to move 
his hands off the seat in front of him.   [The 
accused] would reasonably believe he was not 
free to get out of the car and walk away.  Indeed, 
[the accused] would almost undoubtedly have 
aroused the police officers’ suspicions had he 
tried to leave, since that would necessarily 
involve disobeying  [the officer’s] direction to 
keep his hands on the seat.   It follows that [the 
accused] was under psychological restraint at 
least from the point when [the officer] ordered 
him to keep his hands on the car seat in front of 
him. [para. 41] 
This detention, however, was not arbitrary. “Officer 
safety is a valid reason to take reasonable steps to 
control the vehicle,” said Justice Epstein. 
Furthermore, the accused’s s. 10(b) rights were not 
breached. “It is well-established that lawful 
detention arising  out of an HTA matter does not 
engage a person’s rights set out in s. 10(b) of the 
Charter.”
Unreasonable Search
Assuming  the accused’s s. 8  Charter rights were 
breached when the officer, without lawful authority, 
asked him for information necessary to conduct a 
CPIC check while detained, the trial judge made no 
error in admitting  the gun under s. 24(2). The 
accused’s appeal against conviction was dismissed 
and his sentence was upheld.
 
A Slightly Different View
 
Justice Doherty would also dismiss the 
appeal. He saw no reason to review the 
trial judge’s finding  that the accused 
was not detained and, even if he was, it was not 
arbitrary and did not engage s. 10(b) rights. As well, 
assuming  that police questioning  was an unlawful 
search that violated s. 8, he agreed that the trial 
judge did not err in admitting the gun as evidence.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Officer safety is a 
valid reason to take 
reasonable steps to 
control the vehicle.”
“If a person obeys a police command on the basis that he or she believes there is no alternative, 
that person is detained for the purposes of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter.”
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WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
WORKPLACE COMPUTER 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. McNeice, 2013 BCCA 98
 
An elementary school principal was 
s u s p e c t e d o f a c c e s s i n g  a n d 
downloading  child pornography 
from an IP  address associated with 
the home where he was the only 
male resident. The police obtained and executed a 
search warrant at his home and seized two 
computers – a desk top conta in ing  chi ld 
pornographic images in its recycle bin and a laptop 
with no incriminating  evidence. As for the accused’s 
school laptop, the police had insufficient grounds for 
obtaining  a warrant to search it. It was assigned to 
him for his exclusive use and was located in his 
office at the elementary school. Police asked the 
school district Superintendent for the laptop, which 
was turned over and its hard drive searched. Using 
special software, police found more than 100 
images of child pornography on temporary Internet 
files in the recycle bin. The accused was charged 
with possessing and accessing child pornography.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
The trial judge found the computer was 
owned by the school district, had been 
assigned to the accused for his exclusive 
use and he was not prohibited by school 
board policy from using  the laptop for personal 
purposes. But the judge concluded the accused did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. There 
were no personal files on the computer hard drive, 
no password protection and the computer was 
accessible to janitorial staff, the school secretary, 
and senior administrators. As well, his browsing 
history was effectively abandoned when he deleted 
the cache of temporary internet files on it. Moreover, 
even if he had a subjective expectation of privacy, it 
was not objectively reasonable. “In the totality of 
circumstances, I conclude that if it could be found 
that the accused probably had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the deleted cache of 
temporary Internet files on the School District 
laptop, there is not a preponderance of evidence 
establishing  that such an expectation would be 
objectively reasonable,” the judge said. The 
evidence was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of accessing  child pornography, while the 
possession charge was dismissed.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in holding  that he did 
not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, either subjectively or 
objectively, in the school district’s laptop and its 
informational contents. The warrantless search by 
police, he suggested, was a violation of his s. 8 
Charter rights even though the school district 
consented to the search. In his view, the evidence 
obtained from the school issued computer should 
have been ruled inadmissible under s. 24(2).
 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
 
Chief Justice Finch, speaking  for the unanimous 
Court of Appeal, found the accused did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the deleted 
pornographic image files, both subjectively and 
objectively.
 
Subjectively, the accused had an expectation of 
privacy in the deleted files. Rather than abandoning 
the internet files through deletion – which the trial 
judge found was analogous to dumping  physical 
garbage – it was “more consistent with an intention 
on the part of the user to destroy the information, or 
at least to conceal it from view by anyone else, 
including  himself.” As for there being  no password 
protection and therefore no steps to hide or hinder 
access to these personal files, Chief Justice Finch 
concluded “the act of deleting  the files in itself can 
“[T]he deletion of the files was more consistent with an intention to conceal, and thus to 
maintain a privacy interest, than it is with the idea of ‘abandonment’, and an intention to give up a 
privacy interest.”
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be seen as a very deliberate step towards preventing 
others from access to ‘personal files’.” Moreover, the 
School District had no policy prohibiting  the use of 
the laptop computer for personal purposes.
 
The subjective expectation of privacy was also 
objectively reasonable. The school board had no 
policy expressly prohibiting  the accused from using 
the laptop for personal purposes and the deletion of 
the files had the same practical effect of prohibiting 
access by others like password protection. And 
again, the Court noted, “the deletion of the files was 
more consistent with an intention to conceal, and 
thus to maintain a privacy interest, than it is with the 
idea of ‘abandonment’, and an intention to give up a 
privacy interest.”  Furthermore, the nature of the 
information was connected to his biographical core; 
it contained private information as to his interests, 
likes and propensities.
 
Thus, the search of the files by police, without a 
warrant, was a breach of the accused’s s. 8  right to 
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.
 
Admissibility
 
Despite the s. 8 breach, the evidence was admissible 
under s. 24(2). Although the impact of the violation 
on the accused’s Charter protected interests was 
significant, the breach was in the mid to low range 
of seriousness. As well, society’s interest in 
adjudication of the case on its merits – an 
elementary school principal holding  a position of 
trust accessing  child pornography – favoured 
admission of the evidence. Balancing  these 
considerations, the Appeal Court concluded that the 
admission of the unlawfully seized evidence would 
not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Before you are a leader, success is all about 
growing yourself. When you become a leader, 
success is all about growing others.” - Jack Welch
Defence Arguments for Privacy
 
SUBJECTIVELY
• Deletion of the laptop’s temporary Internet files did 
not constitute abandonment. 
• Deletion was more consistent with a wish to keep 
the information private.
• The act of deleting the temporary Internet files was 
the equivalent of protecting them with a password.
• The laptop was assigned only to the accused.
• It was kept in his office which was usually locked 
when he was not there.
• No one else had permission to use it.
• Even though other persons – janitorial staff, the 
school board secretary, and senior district 
administrators – could have accessed the laptop 
sitting on his office desk, none of them would have 
been able to access the deleted browsing history.
• The deleted temporary Internet files were personal, 
as were the e-mails forwarded from his home 
account.
OBJECTIVELY
• The information on the laptop, having been deleted, 
was not in public view.
• The files had not been abandoned.
• The files were confidential, even if on a school 
district laptop.
• The police file recovery technique was intrusive.
• The search revealed intimate details about his 
lifestyle.
 
Crown Arguments Against Privacy
 
SUBJECTIVELY
• The laptop was not a personal computer, but a work 
computer owned by the school district.
• There was no password on the computer. 
• The deletion of the files, while not completely 
analogous to other situations of abandonment, 
demonstrated the accused’s desire to distance 
himself from the files and amounted to a 
relinquishing of control of the files similar to 
abandonment.
OBJECTIVELY
• The accused knew that his Internet use was 
monitored while at school
• He would reasonably have known that he was 
publicly accountable for web use on a school laptop. 
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PASSENGER’S DETENTION NOT 
TRIGGERED ON VEHICLE STOP
R. v. Habrada-Walters, 2013 SKCA 24
 
Two police officers pulled a vehicle 
over to investigate suspicious activity 
at 3:00 am. They had observed the 
accused, a passenger, yelling  from a 
vehicle at two women walking  on the 
sidewalk. He was asking  them to come along. The 
women told police they were fine but that they did 
not want to enter the vehicle. The women then left. 
The officers believed a criminal harassment 
investigation was worthwhile and, at minimum, the 
vehicle occupants should be identified. One officer 
told the the driver he was stopping  the vehicle to 
investigate what was going  on with the girls and 
asked to see a driver’s license and registration. A 
second officer spoke to the accused, asked him what 
was happening  and was told by the accused it was 
“not a crime to talk to girls”.  When asked for 
identification, the accused said “I don’t have to give 
you my name.” The accused was fidgety, nervous 
and would not look the officer in the eye. It 
appeared he was trying  to conceal two cellphones; a 
white and blue one beneath his leg  with his left 
hand and a black one into the map portion of the 
door panel with his right hand. When asked why he 
was trying  to conceal the black phone, the accused 
said he found it at the 7-Eleven and was taking  it 
back. He was reluctant to provide the black phone 
when asked, but when told he had no choice turned 
it over to police. The officer then asked him to step 
out of the vehicle. The officer opened up the phone 
to determine ownership and saw a text message 
which he interpreted as a reference to cocaine.  
The police then received information from dispatch 
that the vehicle had been involved in a hit-and-run, 
its occupants refusing  to give their names at the 
scene of an accident and offering  or commenting 
about drugs to the other party to the accident. Police 
looked at the front of the car and saw minor 
scratches on the front bumper. Both men were 
arrested for hit and run, as parties to the offence, 
placed in the back of the police car, cautioned and 
advised of their right to counsel. Police found $290 
on the accused after searching  him and answered 
seven calls on his cellphone, each one related to a 
request for drugs. The men were advised that their 
jeopardy had changed and they were now under 
investigation for drugs. A drug  dog  was called and 
indicated in the trunk and on the dash, but no drugs 
were found.  The accused was strip searched at the 
police station and 12.5 grams of cocaine was found 
in a large sandwich bag. He was charged with 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The police said there were no traffic 
safety reasons for the stop and the judge 
found its main purpose was to identify 
the vehicle’s occupants with a view to 
running  them on police databases. He found it was 
unnecessary to decide whether the accused, as a 
passenger, had been detained when the vehicle was 
stopped. Instead, he concluded that the accused was 
detained when told to hand over the cellphone and 
step out of the vehicle. This detention, however, was 
not lawful. The police had not observed a crime, 
there was no complaint involving  the men in the car 
and the women stated they were fine. Nor was there 
a problem with males in a vehicle accosting  females 
on city sidewalks. There was no objective basis for 
concluding  the accused or driver were about to 
commit a crime. The detention was therefore 
arbitrary. 
This arbitrary detention, which occurred before the 
receipt of the hit-and-run information, resulted in the 
drugs being  found and the subsequent charge. There 
was a chain of causation from the original detention, 
obtaining  the hit-and-run information, arrest, 
cellphone seizures, answering  them, the strip search, 
through to the charge. The decision to arrest for hit-
and-run was subjectively believed to be true and an 
objectively reasonable conclusion. As for answering 
the cellphone, it could not be known at the time it 
was answered that there was no nexus between it 
and the hit-and-run arrest. The police were therefore 
entitled to seize the cellphones pursuant to the hit-
and-run arrest and answer them. Despite the 
arbitrary detention, the evidence was nonetheless 
admitted under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
Volume 13 Issue 2 - March/April 2013
PAGE 12
trafficking. He was sentenced 2 years less a day in 
jail and a DNA order and firearms ban was imposed. 
 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
 
The accused challenged the trial 
judge’s ruling  on many grounds, 
including:
• he was unlawfully detained at the moment 
that the police stopped the vehicle; 
• the unlawful detention created s. 10(a) and (b) 
Charter breaches;
• the continuing  conversation breached s. 8  of 
the Charter;
• the decision to arrest was not objectively 
reasonable; and
• answering the cellphone was improper.
Detention?
Justice Ottenbreit, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment, found the trial judge did not err in finding 
there was no detention upon the initial stop of the 
vehicle. “It is not improper for police, provided that 
they are in the exercise of their general police 
duties, to make general inquiries of individuals or 
seek to identify individuals but whether a detention 
occurs and whether it is justified depends on the 
circumstances of the case,” he said. As for 
investigative detention, there must be at least the 
suspic ion of recent or ongoing  cr iminal 
offences.  Here, the trial judge was correct to find 
that there was no objective basis for suspecting  or 
concluding  the parties in the car had or were about 
to commit a crime and therefore an investigative 
detention on the accused to discuss the incident 
involving  the women and obtain identification was 
not justified. 
 
The accused, however, was not detained, either 
physically or psychologically, until he was “told he 
had no choice but to hand over the cellphone and to 
step out of the vehicle,” said Justice Ottenbreit. “The 
interaction was, up to that point, a ‘delay’ or ‘kept 
waiting’ in an attempt to obtain identification 
information from [the accused] by co-operation, 
which [the accused] pointed out he was under no 
obligation to provide.” Thus, absent a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, an arbitrary detention 
occurred when the accused was told to hand over 
the cellphone and step from the vehicle.
 
s. 10 Charter?
Under s. 10 of the Charter “Everyone has the right 
on arrest or detention (a) to be informed promptly of 
the reasons therefor [and] (b) to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay and to be informed of that 
right.” In this case, the trial judge did not determine 
whether the accused’s s. 10 rights were violated. The 
Court of Appeal found that since the accused was 
not detained when the vehicle was first stopped 
neither s. 10(a) or (b) were triggered at that point. 
When the accused was detained, albeit arbitrary 
(asked to hand over the cellphone and step out of 
the vehicle) he was aware that the police were 
investigating  what was going  on with the girls and 
the reason for the police inquiries. Further, even if he 
did not properly receive his s. 10(a) rights, the arrest 
for the hit-and-run was almost concurrent with the 
arbitrary detention and he was, minutes later, 
informed of the reasons for arrest. Thus, any s. 10(a) 
breach respecting  the arbitrary detention mattered 
little in the s. 24(2) analysis.
 
As for s. 10(b), the investigative detention gave rise 
to the right to instruct counsel without delay and 
there is no temporary suspension of this right in 
cases of short investigative detentions. No such 
rights were given when the accused stepped from 
the vehicle for the criminal harassment investigation. 
Events, however, were moving  rapidly forward and 
“It is not improper for police, provided that they are in the exercise of their general police 
duties, to make general inquiries of individuals or seek to identify individuals but whether a 
detention occurs and whether it is justified depends on the circumstances of the case.”
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within minutes the purpose of the detention had 
changed to a hit-and-run, the accused was arrested 
and he was informed of his right to counsel. Justice 
Ottenbreit found the breach only a technical 
one. “Although the trial judge erred when he failed 
to find a s. 10(b) Charter breach, that error is of little 
consequence,” he said. “There were no statements 
taken from [the accused] to which any s. 10(b) 
breach could be referable. That breach likewise had 
no nexus with the drugs which were found and 
which [the accused] sought to have excluded.”
 
s. 8 Charter?
The conversation between the officer and the 
accused before detention was no more than a 
discussion.  The only cellphone initially taken by 
police prior to arrest was the phone the accused said 
he found. The trial judge ruled he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it. The accused told police 
he had found the phone and was taking  it back to 
where he found it.  He was not the owner and his 
intention was to disclaim control of it. There was no 
s. 8 breach in the officer receiving the phone. 
Grounds for Arrest?
 
The trial judge properly determined that the police 
officer’s decision to arrest the accused on the basis 
that they might be the same two individuals who 
had been involved in the hit-and-run was objectively 
reasonable.  “The police had received information 
that the same vehicle with two people in it had been 
involved in a hit-and-run,” said the Appeal Court. 
“The officers saw damage to the stopped vehicle. It 
is indeed a reasonable conclusion that there was a 
likelihood that these were the same two individuals 
that were in the vehicle earlier that evening.”
 
Nexus between hit-and-run arrest and 
answering the cellphone?  
Once the accused was arrested, the cellphones were 
taken as an incident of arrest.  The absence of a 
nexus between the arrest for hit-and-run and 
answering  the cellphones could not be known when 
they were answered.  Accordingly, the police could 
answer calls coming  to the cellphones following  the 
arrest.  As well, the answering  of the cellphone did 
not intrude into its informational contents. 
Admissibility
 
The trial judge did not err in admitting  the evidence, 
even if the technical violations of s. 10(a) and (b) 
rights were also considered. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed and his conviction upheld. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO DETENTION AT TIME 
GROUNDS FORMED: 
s. 10(b) RIGHTS NOT TRIGGERED
R. v. MacMillan, 2013 ONCA 109
A police officer was dispatched to a 
boating  accident at about 5:30 pm. 
On arrival he saw a body covered 
with a sheet on the shore and two 
people at the end of the dock. One 
was being  attended to by a paramedic and the 
accused, a young  woman, was sitting. The officer 
approached the accused, who appeared distraught 
and crying, and attempted to comfort her. During  a 
three to four-minute conversation, the officer 
detected an odour of alcoholic beverage on her 
breath. She said she had four drinks and was driving 
the boat. At 5:50 pm the officer formed a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused had alcohol in her body 
and had operated a vessel within the preceding 
three hours, sufficient to give the officer grounds to 
make an approved screening  device (ASD) demand 
under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, but he 
chose not to. Instead, he left the accused and went 
to deal with other people arriving at the scene. 
In the meantime, the accused fainted and the 
paramedics took her to the ambulance. The officer 
took an ASD from his cruiser, entered the 
ambulance, read the ASD demand at 6:19 pm and 
demonstrated how she was to provide a sample. The 
accused became very upset, began to cry and the 
officer did not seek a breath test at that time, instead 
preferring  to wait and ensure she was medically fit. 
The officer left the scene with the accused in an 
ambulance at 6:46 pm and arrived at the hospital at 
6:51 pm. At 7:06 pm the emergency room physician 
finished the accused’s examination and said she was 
medically fit to provide a sample of her breath. At 
7:16 pm the accused provided a breath sample and 
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registered a fail. At 7:18 pm she was arrested for 
“over 80” causing  death, informed her of her right to 
counsel and spoke to a lawyer at 7:32 pm. At 8:05 
pm the doctor cleared her to leave the hospital and 
she arrived at the police station at 8:14 pm. She 
subsequently provided two breath samples of 170mg
% each at  8:24 pm and 8:42 pm. She was charged 
with operating  a vessel over 80mg% causing  death 
and impaired operation causing death.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice,
The trial judge concluded that the 
accused’s Charter rights were violated as 
a result of two delays; a pre-demand 
delay (in making  the ASD demand) and 
post-demand delay (in facilitating  the ASD test). The 
judge concluded that the accused was detained as 
soon as the officer formulated the necessary grounds 
to make the ASD demand at 5:50 pm and she would 
not been allowed to leave. The demand was 
required to be made forthwith, but it wasn’t made 
until 6:19 pm. The judge found this pre-demand 
delay was not justified. Since there was no objective 
basis for suspending  the taking  of the breath sample, 
there was no basis for not giving  the accused her s. 
10(b) rights. The judge also ruled that the post-
demand delay was not justified. Since there was 
non-compliance with s. 254(2), the accused’s 
Charter rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) were 
breached as a result of the two delays. The 
unconstitutionally obtained results of the breath tests 
were excluded under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. It submitted that the trial 
judge erred in holding  that the 
accused was detained before the demand was made 
and the demand, if it had to be made when the 
officer formed his grounds, was still valid. A delay 
was justified because the officer had to attend to 
other people arriving  at the scene and get the ASD 
from his car, power it up and explain its use. 
Temporal Limits 
The validity of a s. 254(2) demand involves 
consideration of temporal requirements. First, the 
officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the person “has alcohol” in their body when the 
demand is made and that the person was operating 
the vessel within the preceding  three hours. In 
addition, there are temporal limits that relate to both 
the timing of the demand and the timing of the test. 
Timing of Demand
When a motorist is required to comply with a 
screening  demand under s. 254(2), they are detained 
within the meaning  of s. 10(b). However, requiring 
compliance with the demand before advising  the 
detainee of their right to counsel and providing  an 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer is a reasonable 
limit within the meaning  of s. 1 of the Charter. 
Generally, cases involving  the interplay between s. 
254(2) and s. 10(b) have been in the context of a 
motorist being  detained, either when pulled over by 
police or by reason of the demand itself. In those 
R. v. MacMillan Timeline
Time Activity
5:30 pm call dispatched
5:50 pm reasonable suspicion formed
6:19 pm ASD demand made
6:46 pm left for police station in ambulance
6:51 pm arrived at hospital
7:06 pm doctor finished examination
7:16 pm ASD sample fail
7:18 pm arrested, right to counsel advisement
7:32 pm spoke to lawyer
8:05 pm left for hospital
8:14 pm arrived at police station
8:24 pm first breath sample 170mg%
8:42 pm second breath sample 170mg%
pre-
demand 
delay
post-
demand 
delay
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cases, where a detention has occurred, the 
“forthwith” requirement requires the demand be 
made as soon as the officer has formed the requisite 
grounds to make it. Without this immediacy 
requirement, s. 254(2) would not pass Charter 
scrutiny. However, in cases where the suspect has 
not been detained (as here), Justice Rosenberg  was 
of the view that greater flexibility with the forthwith 
requirement could be tolerated between the forming 
of the grounds and the making of the demand. 
In this case, Justice Rosenberg  found the trial judge 
erred in holding  that the accused was detained from 
the moment the officer had the grounds to make the 
demand and therefore was required to make the s. 
254(2) demand immediately upon forming  the 
reasonable suspicion:
I agree with the [Crown] that the 
trial judge erred in holding that the 
[accused] was detained before the 
demand was made. Before the 
demand was made, the [accused] 
was not physically restrained nor 
under any legal obligation to 
comply with a restrictive demand 
or direction. [E]ven where a person 
is under investigation for criminal 
activity and is asked questions, the 
person is not necessarily detained. 
In the absence of a legal obligation 
to comply, detention arises where a 
reasonable person would conclude 
by reason of the state conduct that 
he or she had no choice but to 
comply. [para. 36]
In this case there was no evidence that the accused 
was detained before the officer made the demand. 
Just because he would not have let her leave if she 
had tried does not mean that she was detained. 
“Until the demand was made, the psychological 
detention did not materialize,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “[I]t is not until the officer’s subjective intent 
is accompanied by actual conduct that the intent 
becomes relevant for constitutional purposes.” Since 
there was no detention, the accused’s ss. 9 and 10(b) 
rights were not violated before the demand was 
made. The forthwith requirement should have been 
applied flexibly. The 29-minute delay between the 
formation of the suspicion and the demand was 
reasonably necessary and the demand complied 
with the forthwith requirement. There were exigent 
circumstances at the scene. The arresting  officer was 
dealing  with the arrival of distraught friends and 
family members, and the accused was unconscious 
for an uncertain length of time. 
Timing of Test
Since s. 254(2)(b) requires the vehicle operator to 
forthwith comply with the demand, it follows that 
the officer must also be in a position to facilitate 
compliance forthwith. This forthwith requirement 
flows from the making  of the demand, not from 
when the officer had the grounds to make it. The 
officer delayed the taking  of an ASD sample at the 
hospital for 57 minutes from the time the demand 
was made at the scene. Although he 
wanted to ensure the accused was 
medically fit before proceeding  with the 
sample, the officer could provide no 
justification for not affording  her the right 
to counsel. As the trial judge found, there 
was no reason not to give the accused her 
s. 10(b) rights even if the officer had good 
reason to hold off requiring  her to comply 
with the demand by waiting  to see if she 
was medically fit. The Court of Appeal 
agreed that the accused’s s. 10(b) rights 
were infringed and that the delay in 
facilitating  the ASD sample while the 
accused was detained rendered the 
demand invalid under s. 254(2). The 
“forthwith” criterion had not been met. 
Thus, the subsequent s. 254(3) demand was 
also invalid. 
Admissibility
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two 
errors in deciding  Charter breaches. First, he 
erroneously concluded that the accused was 
detained from the moment the officer formed the 
grounds to make the ASD demand and also in 
holding  that the demand was not made forthwith. 
These errors tainted the trial judge’s s. 24(2) findings 
and, in rebalancing  the various factors, the evidence 
was admissible. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, 
the accused’s acquittals were set aside and a new 
trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Until the demand 
was made, the 
psychological 
detention did not 
materialize. ... “[I]t is 
not until the officer’s 
subjective intent is 
accompanied by 
actual conduct that 
the intent becomes 
relevant for 
constitutional 
purposes.”
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CREDIBILITY UNDERMINES 
‘SAFETY’ SEARCH:
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
R. v. Nartey, 2013 ONCA 215
Shortly after midnight two police 
officers observed a vehicle exit the 
parking  lot of a notorious strip bar 
and fail to come to a complete stop 
before making  a turn at a red light. 
After pulling  the vehicle over some distance after the 
red light, the driver (accused) was asked for his 
licence, registration and insurance. As a ticket was 
being  written, the officers received information by 
computer that the accused had been convicted of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking, had two 
firearm prohibitions and was associated to a street 
gang. They also saw movement in the car which, 
combined with the accused’s patronage of the strip 
bar and his record, caused the senior officer to have 
concern for their safety. Both officers immediately 
got out of their cruiser, approached the vehicle, 
asked the accused to step out and patted him down 
for weapons. No weapons were found but the senior 
officer felt what he believed to be a large wad of 
cash in the accused’s pocket. The senior officer then 
decided to search the vehicle, noticing  Bounce dryer 
sheets sticking  out of the vents, four air fresheners 
hanging  in the vehicle, and the smell of fresh, 
unburned marijuana. The accused was arrested for a 
s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act 
offence, the vehicle was further searched and a half 
pound of marijuana and two loaded guns were 
found in the locked glove compartment. Later, two 
bags of crack cocaine were discovered on the 
accused.
Ontario Court of Justice 
At trial the senior officer said the accused 
reached into the back seat, grabbed a 
small black duffle bag, placed it in the 
front passenger seat and then appeared to 
rifle through the bag. When the accused then tossed 
the bag  into the back seat, it looked less full and less 
heavy. This black bag, however, was not in the 
photos of the vehicle or its contents taken after the 
arrest, nor was it an exhibit at trial. The judge did not 
accept the senior officer’s testimony regarding  the 
black bag  and rejected his evidence that the pat 
down search and subsequent search of the vehicle 
were motivated by concerns for officer safety.  The 
judge concluded that the Highway Traffic Act stop, 
even if validly made for rolling  through the red light, 
became an improper and unjustified investigative 
detention once the officers received the information 
with respect to the accused on their computer. In the 
judge’s view, the officers embarked on a “fishing 
trip”. The pat down search and subsequent vehicle 
search were unlawful and the evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2). The judge found that the 
senior officer had attempted to tailor his evidence to 
fit a pattern which would have been allowed by the 
courts. Plus, the judge also commented that he was 
not persuaded that the accused had in fact made a 
rolling stop. He was acquitted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The C rown cha l l enged t he 
accused’s acquittals arguing, in 
part, that the trial judge made 
mistakes that tainted his entire 
Charter analysis. But the Court of Appeal disagreed. 
In this case, the trial judge found that the Crown had 
failed to discharge the onus of justifying  the 
warrantless searches on the ground of officer safety. 
The judge made credibility findings in assessing  the 
officers’ evidence in relation to the grounds offered 
for the searches. He doubted all of the officers’ 
evidence, including  their evidence that the driver 
had made a rolling  stop at a red light. But he did not 
find as fact that the rolling  stop had not occurred. 
The trial judge made no error of law and the Crown’s 
appeal against the accused’s acquittal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“The most dangerous leadership  myth is that leaders 
are born-that there is a genetic factor to leadership. 
That’s nonsense; in fact, the opposite is true. Leaders 
are made rather than born.” - Warren Bennis
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REASONABLE GROUNDS:
OFFICER ENTITLED TO DRAW 
INFERENCES
R. v. Jacob, 2013 MBCA 29 
As a result of an impaired driving 
Checkstop program police pulled over 
a car at about 2:20 am after they saw 
it exit a parking  lot, signal to turn right 
but instead go straight ahead. Once 
the tinted driver’s window was opened, no one was 
in the driver’s seat. Instead, the accused was sitting 
in the front passenger seat. He claimed that the 
driver had left the vehicle and gone to a bar to get 
one of their friends. The accused smelled of alcohol, 
his eyes were “glossy” and his speech was slightly 
slurred. The officer  made a demand for a roadside 
screening  test and took the accused to the 
Checkstop van so a test could be administered by an 
officer qualified to perform one. The accused failed 
the test and was arrested for driving  over 80mg%. A 
demand for a breathalyzer sample followed.  The 
accused refused, stating, “You know that I am drunk, 
I know that I am drunk, but I was not even 
driving.”  No breath sample was provided and the 
accused was charged with refusal and driving  while 
disqualified.
Manitoba Provincial Court
The investigating  officer testified that 
when the roadside screening  demand 
was made he suspected that the accused 
was impaired, but did not believe there 
were reasonable grounds to make a breathalyzer 
demand. He also said he understood that a failure of 
the screening  test meant the accused had been 
driving  with a blood alcohol level over .08.  The 
judge, however, found there was no evidence that 
the device was approved.  The investigating  officer 
never identified it as an approved device nor did the 
officer administering  the breath test provide 
evidence. The judge concluded that the Crown must 
prove that the screening  device was an approved 
device before the officer could rely on its results in 
forming  the reasonable grounds required to make a 
breathalyzer demand. With no evidence that the 
device was approved, the judge ruled the test results 
(ASD failure) inadmissible for the purposes of 
forming  the officer’s reasonable grounds for making 
the breath demand. Since the officer did not have 
grounds for the breath demand the accused was 
acquitted of refusing to provide a breath sample.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal judge found it was not 
necessary that the Crown prove by 
testimony that the device used was an 
approved device before the police could 
rely on the test results in forming  reasonable grounds 
to make the breath demand. Instead, a court must 
determine whether the police officer had reasonable 
grounds to make the demand based on all of the 
facts known to him and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, including  a screening  test result 
communicated to him by another officer. The police 
officer must only exclude from consideration those 
facts that the officer finds unreliable or deficient (eg. 
the officer was aware that a deficiency in the 
screening  device or in the manner in which it was 
being  used would render unreliable results). Here, 
the appeal judge reviewed the facts known to the 
investigating  officer and concluded that, when all of 
those facts were put together and viewed objectively 
from the perspective of a reasonable person, there 
was sufficient information to make the breathalyzer 
demand. A court could infer that the screening 
device had been approved because it was provided 
by the police department and the officer was 
“entitled to assume that his superiors have arranged 
to screen drivers using  appropriate equipment.” The 
accused’s acquittal was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused again attacked the 
grounds for the breath demand, 
arguing  that the officer did not 
have subjective grounds to make it 
and that there would not have been objective 
grounds to do so without the results of the screening 
test. In his view, an officer is not entitled to rely on 
the results of a screening  device if it is not approved 
under the Criminal Code unless there is other 
evidence proving  that it is reliable. He also 
Volume 13 Issue 2 - March/April 2013
PAGE 18
suggested the officer could not have inferred that the 
screening  device had been approved. The Crown, 
on the other hand, opined that the reasonable 
grounds required for making  a proper breathalyzer 
demand can be based on facts and information 
available to the police officer and on inferences 
drawn by them.  It suggested that the Crown need 
not establish that the device was approved but only 
that the officer believed that it was and that the 
belief was objectively reasonable. In this case, the 
Crown submitted that the officer had the requisite 
subjective belief in the screening  test’s reliability - he 
made an arrest after the test - and that his belief in 
making  the breath demand was objectively 
reasonable.  
Reasonable Grounds
A police officer must have 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
an accused has committed an 
offence under s. 253 of the 
Cr im ina l Code t o make a 
breathalyzer demand under s. 
254(3). A screening  device test is 
an investigatory tool that assists 
police in furnishing  the necessary 
reasonable grounds. Such a test 
can be administered by police if 
they have a reasonable suspicion 
that the driver has alcohol in their 
body. A fail result, in proper 
circumstances, can provide 
sufficient reasonable grounds to 
justify a breathalyzer demand. But a fail result on a 
screening  device, unlike a breathalyzer test which 
precisely determines the driver’s alcohol level, is not 
subject to criminal liability. It is not evidence of 
impairment. “It is a screening  test to be used by a 
police officer, together with whatever other 
information he or she has, to determine whether 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
driver was impaired and, on that basis, to make a 
breathalyzer demand,” said Justice Beard, authoring 
the Court of Appeal’s opinion. “As such, the result of 
the screening  test is subject to the same rules of 
admissibility and use for that purpose as is other 
information gathered by an officer, including 
hearsay evidence.” 
Justice Beard described the reasonable grounds 
standard this way:
There are two components to reasonable 
grounds – an objective one and a subjective 
one.  Both ss. 254(3) and 495(1) require that a 
police officer subjectively have an honest belief 
that the accused has committed the offence and 
that objectively there must be reasonable 
grounds for that belief. ...
The law is that, in determining  whether the 
officer had reasonable grounds to make the 
breathalyzer demand, the court is required to 
take in to account the to ta l i ty o f the 
circumstances known to the officer. [references 
omitted, paras. 25-26]
 
And further:
[A] police officer can draw the 
facts on which he relies to form 
his reasonable grounds from 
many sou rce s , i nc lud ing 
informants, other police officers 
and citizens who call the police 
to report an offence, because 
reasonable grounds can be 
based on information received 
from third parties without 
i n f r i n g i n g t h e h e a r s a y 
rule. Further, the police officer is 
entitled to reject or discard 
information that he has good 
reason to believe is unreliable ... 
and to draw inferences from the 
facts that he accepts.
The standard of proof for reasonable grounds to 
believe, being  a reasonable belief that an 
offence has been committed, is not a high or 
overly onerous standard. While the officer needs 
to show more than a suspicion, the reasonable 
grounds standard is less than that of a prima 
facie case or proof on a balance of probabilities 
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt .  
[references omitted, paras. 33-34]
The Court of Appeal concluded these rules regarding 
reasonable grounds apply equally to the facts and 
circumstances requiring  an accused have care and 
control of a vehicle as they do to whether the 
“The standard of proof for 
reasonable grounds to 
believe ... is not a high or overly 
onerous standard. While the 
officer needs to show more 
than a suspicion, the 
reasonable grounds standard 
is less than that of a prima facie 
case or proof on a balance of 
probabilities or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”
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screening  device used was approved. He again 
summarized the standard as follows:
- there are two components to reasonable 
grounds – whether the police officer had a 
subjective belief, honestly held, that he had 
reasonable grounds to arrest or to demand a 
breath sample and whether a reasonable 
person in the position of the police officer 
would conclude that there were reasonable 
grounds for the arrest or the demand;
- in weighing  the evidence, the court should take 
into account the totality of the circumstances 
known to the police officer and should not 
examine and test each piece of evidence and 
each factor individually;
- the question is not whether the facts, 
circumstances and inferences ultimately prove 
to be true, but whether it was reasonable for 
the police officer to believe, at the time, that 
the facts and circumstances were true, to draw 
the inferences that were drawn and to rely on 
them at the time of the arrest or the 
breathalyzer demand;
- the standard of proof for reasonable grounds to 
believe is not high or particularly onerous – it 
has been referred to as “credibly-based 
probability,” which, on a spectrum of proof, is 
higher than a reasonable suspicion that an 
offence has been committed, but lower than 
proof on a balance of probabilities (the civil 
standard) or proof of a prima facie case. [para. 
35]
In this case, the trial judge erred by holding  that the 
police officer could only rely on the screening  test 
results in formulating  reasonable grounds for making 
the breathalyzer demand if the Crown proved that 
the screening  device used was approved. Instead, 
the trial judge should have asked whether the officer 
subjectively had an honest belief that he had 
sufficient grounds to make the breathalyzer demand 
and whether that subjective belief was reasonable 
based on all of the facts and information known at 
the time that the breathalyzer demand was made. 
Unless the judge found the officer did not honestly 
believe that the results were reliable or that his belief 
was unreasonable based on the facts of the case, the 
fail result should not have been excluded. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and the order of a 
new trial was upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
   SIDEBAR
The Court of Appeal highlighted the following 
facts and circumstances that were known to 
the officer in relation to the reliability and use 
of the screening test results on the question of 
whether there were reasonable grounds to 
make the breathalyzer demand: 
• The officer operating the screening 
device was trained to perform the 
screening test.
• Police were working as part of a 
roadside Checkstop program.
• The officer operating the screening 
device was in a police Checkstop van.
• The officer operating the screening 
device was called over to perform a 
roadside screening test.
• The accused entered the police van 
and, very shortly after, the officer 
operating the screening device 
advised that the accused had failed 
the ASD test, which the investigating 
officer believed was an “alcohol 
screening device” test.
• The investigating officer believed 
that a failure meant that the accused 
had been driving with a blood alcohol 
level in excess of .08.  
“[The investigating officer] clearly 
inferred from this that the screening test 
results were reliable and that he could rely 
on them in making the breathalyzer 
demand,” said Justice Beard. “There was 
no evidence of any facts known to him 
that should have led him to believe, or to 
be concerned, that the screening device 
used for the test was not approved, was 
not reliable, or was not functioning 
properly.”
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NEW & LESS SERIOUS TURN DID 
NOT RE-TRIGGER RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL
R. v. Paulin, 2013 NBCA 15
 
Police obtained a warrant to search 
the accused’s residence in relation to 
the offences of possessing  marihuana 
and methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking. At the time the 
warrant was executed, police explained it to the 
accused and read him his right to remain silent and 
right to counsel. He said he understood his rights. 
Police seized marihuana from a pocket of the 
accused’s jacket and about 300 bottles of beer found 
in the residence. The accused was arrested for 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and again informed of his rights, including  the right 
to counsel. When asked if he wanted to speak to a 
lawyer he replied “not now”. He was then informed 
that if he changed his mind, he need only tell a 
police officer and he would then be able to speak to 
a lawyer. He was transported to the police station 
where he was again informed of his right to silence 
and his right to counsel. He said “not right now” and 
“I want to speak with someone later” in response. 
Again it was explained that if he wanted to speak to 
a lawyer, he only need ask and the recording  would 
be stopped to allow him to do so. He then made an 
inculpatory statement. The accused was charged 
with possessing  marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. He was also given a ticket for violating  s. 
132 of New Brunswick’s Liquor Control Act but it 
was later withdrawn by the Crown.
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The accused argued that his statement 
was obtained in breach of s. 10(a) (reason 
for arrest) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of 
the Charter  because he did not know, at 
the time it was provided, that he was being 
investigated for the alcohol found in his residence. 
The interrogating  officer admitted that he did not 
limit his questions to possession of marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. He said he questioned the 
accused about the large quantity of liquor found 
even though he was not informed about the alcohol 
investigation. The officer also said the liquor line of 
questioning, which he felt was secondary to the 
main scope of the investigation, only took place 
after the questioning  concerning  the marihuana 
possession.  The trial judge accepted the accused’s 
submission and excluded the statement because of 
the failure by the police to inform him they were 
also investigating  the alcohol related offence. In the 
judge’s view, an accused must know exactly what 
charges or jeopardy they face so as they can make a 
proper decision whether or not to speak to a lawyer. 
The accused was acquitted. 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal suggesting  the trial judge 
erred in finding  ss. 10(a) and (b) 
Charter violations. The Crown 
submitted that the accused did understand the extent 
of his jeopardy and that his waiver was valid. On the 
other hand, the accused asserted that he was not 
informed prior to providing  his statement that an 
investigation would be conducted in relation to the 
alcohol. Therefore his decision to waive his right to 
counsel was not fully informed. In his opinion, he 
should have received yet another warning  regarding 
the right to counsel when the investigation shifted 
from “marihuana” to “alcohol.” The officer’s failure 
to do so breached his rights under s. 10(b), which in 
turn invalidated the initial waiver of his right to 
counsel that was given when the investigation dealt 
exclusively with marihuana.
BY THE BOOK:
s. 132 New Brunswick’s Liquor Control Act
Except as provided by this Act or 
the regulations, no person shall, 
within the Province, by himself, his 
clerk, employee, servant or agent, 
expose or keep for sale, or directly or 
indirectly or upon any pretence or upon any 
device, sell or offer to sell, liquor.
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Justice Bell, authoring  the unanimous Court of 
Appeal judgment, found that not every change in 
jeopardy will require the police to provide a further 
opportunity for the arrestee to consult with counsel. 
Instead, the change in jeopardy must be 
fundamental, taking  a new and more serious turn, 
before triggering  the requirement that police renew 
or again advise a suspect of their right to counsel. 
Concerning  the extent to which information must be 
given pursuant to s. 10(a), the Court of Appeal 
stated:
The detained person must know “generally” the 
jeopardy being faced and be able to appreciate 
the consequences of deciding  for or against 
counsel.  The suspect need not know the exact 
charges or “exactly what he is faced with” as 
suggested by the trial judge. In this case, it is 
evident the [accused] knew the seriousness of 
the charge against him (possession of marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking): the warrant was 
read to him when the search began; he 
witnessed the seizure of the bags containing a 
green substance (later identified as marihuana); 
he was arrested and informed of the reason 
therefor; he was taken to the police station; he 
was placed in an interrogation room; and he 
would be presumed to know that the potential 
sentence, should he be found guilty, could 
include incarceration for an extended period of 
time. [para. 19]
And further:
An offence under the Liquor Control Act is 
without doubt different from the offence of 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. It remains to determine, before 
deciding whether a second caution was 
necessary, whether such an offence is more 
serious. It is obvious that a regulatory offence 
punishable under s.  56(5) of the Provincial 
Offences Procedure Act ..., as a category E 
offence by a fine (up to a maximum of 
$5,200.00) cannot be considered a “more 
serious” offence than one of possession of 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. For an 
amount of marihuana not exceeding three 
kilograms, s. 5(4) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act carries a punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of up to five years less a 
day and a criminal record, which, of course, 
precludes full participation in Canadian society.  
The [accused] was aware of the seriousness of 
the offence with which he was charged and for 
which he was given the initial police caution.  
He was also aware that he was never suspected 
of a different and more serious offence.  [para. 
24]
Justice Bell concluded that the initial caution was 
sufficient because “the investigation did not take a 
new and more serious turn as a result of the 
questions concerning  the alcohol [and the officer] 
did not have a duty to restate the [accused’s] right to 
counsel.” Since there were no ss. 10(a) or (b) 
breaches, there was no need to conduct an analysis 
under s. 24(2). The trial judge erred when she found 
that the police had a positive duty to repeat the 
police caution when the investigation took a new 
and less serious turn, the Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the accused’s acquittal quashed and a new 
trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The detained person must know ‘generally’ the jeopardy being faced and be able to 
appreciate the consequences of deciding for or against counsel. The suspect need not 
know the exact charges or ‘exactly what he is faced with’.”
BY THE BOOK:
s. 10(a) & (b) Charter
Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention
a) to be informed promptly of the 
reasons therefore;
b) to retain and instruct counsel without 
delay and to be informed of that right; ...
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ALTHOUGH DETENTION 
UNLAWFUL, RESISTANCE 
EXCESSIVE: GUN ADMITTED
R. v. Blackwood, 2013 ONCA 219
Two police officers stopped a car 
after observing  its driver make an 
illegal right-hand turn. The accused, 
a passenger, was asked for and 
provided his Ontario health card for 
identification. The officer recognized the accused 
from a previous experience and had seen his name 
on a bulletin at the police station as a known 
offender who could be armed or dangerous. He was 
permitted to undo his seatbelt but was asked to keep 
his hands in view. A computer check revealed a 
Caution for the accused. He was to be considered 
violent, an escape risk, known to carry prohibited 
firearms and the subject of a no contact order. He 
was fidgety, began to sweat profusely and was 
wearing  jeans and two shirts even though it was a 
very hot day. He was directed to step from the 
vehicle and escorted to the back of the car so he 
could be asked a few questions to clarify the 
information police had about him. When he was 
asked if he had any weapons, the accused pushed 
the officer causing  him to lose his balance, a 
physical altercation ensued and the accused was 
arrested. He was searched and police found a 
loaded handgun tucked in his waistband. He was 
subsequently charged with numerous firearm-
related, assaulting  police and resisting  arrest 
offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
There was conflicting  versions of what 
happened. The accused said he did 
nothing  more than swat at the officer’s 
arm when told to put his hands on the 
car. The police denied this, instead saying  the 
accused pushed one officer so hard he lost his 
balance, leading  to the altercation that followed. The 
judge concluded that the police had the right to stop 
the vehicle for the observed Highway Traffic Act 
offence. The request for identification was part of a 
general inquiry and no physical or psychological 
detention occurred at this point. The directive to the 
accused to keep his hands where they could be seen 
was precautionary in nature and did not trigger a 
detention. However, the officer’s further directive for 
the accused to exit the car, go to its rear and keep 
his hands in front of him constituted detention. The 
judge found the accused’s removal from the vehicle 
was unlawful and breached s. 9 of the Charter 
because it was not based on a reasonable suspicion 
of any crime. 
It was not reasonable, however, for the accused to 
push the officer so hard that he lost his balance. 
Although individuals are allowed to use reasonable 
force to resist an unlawful detention, the accused’s 
actions were offensive, not defensive, and he used 
more force than necessary to resist, having  gone 
beyond what was reasonable in the circumstances. 
The search that followed did not breach s. 8 of the 
Charter. It was not unreasonable having  been 
conducted in exigent circumstances following  the 
assault on the officer. Further, there was no s. 10(b) 
Charter breach as the accused had been detained for 
only a few seconds and the police had no 
opportunity to advise him of his right to counsel 
because of the physical altercation. The judge found 
the handgun was not obtained as a result of the s. 9 
Charter violation and, even if it was, its admission 
under s. 24(2) would not bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The gun was admitted as 
evidence and several gun-related and assault/resist 
convictions were entered. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing  his rights 
under ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the 
Charter were breached such that 
the evidence that he was carrying  a loaded firearm 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2). But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed, finding  the trial judge did 
not misapprehend the evidence nor fail to give 
adequate reasons to explain why she rejected the 
accused’s evidence.
First, the trial judge found that the police arbitrarily 
detained the accused. Any arguments in this regard 
about the implausibility of the officers’ evidence 
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could not succeed since the trial judge found in his 
favour on the s. 9 Charter issue. Second, the trial 
judge considered the conflicting  evidence given by 
the accused and the police officers before holding 
that the accused, although arbitrarily detained, used 
excessive force in reacting  to the unlawful detention. 
The trial judge explained why she preferred the 
evidence of the two police officers and her reasons 
fo r do ing  so were no t based upon any 
misapprehension of the evidence. The Court of 
Appeal noted its role was not to retry this aspect of 
the case. Third, the trial judge found that the police 
had no opportunity to advise the accused of his right 
to counsel as it was a matter of seconds between the 
time he stepped out of the car and the time the 
altercation broke out. This finding  was not 
unsupported by the evidence nor did it reveal any 
error of law. Finally, the Court of Appeal saw no 
error in the trial judge’s conclusion that in any event, 
the evidence of the loaded firearm should not be 
excluded pursuant to s. 24(2). The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note:  Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Blackwood, [2009] O.J. No. 5393, R. v. Blackwood, 
2010 ONSC 1360, R. v. Blackwood, 2010 ONSC 
6141, 
LEGITIMATE CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATORY INTEREST DID 
NOT TAINT STOP
R. v. Morris, 2013 ONCA 223
Shortly after midnight two police 
officers on general patrol were 
checking  licence plate numbers on 
cars they saw driving. Nothing  of 
interest was noted and no cars were 
stopped. When the licence plate of a black Honda 
Civic with tinted windows was checked, a CPIC hit 
flagged the registered owner with “Caution,” “armed 
and dangerous,” “violent” and “domestic violence”. 
The car was pulled over and both officers detected a 
strong, pungent smell of fresh marijuana, providing 
them with what they believed were reasonable 
grounds to arrest the driver (accused) for possession 
of marijuana. The accused was asked for his driver's 
licence, ownership and insurance papers. When 
asked if he had been smoking  marijuana that night 
and whether he had any in the car, the accused said, 
"[t]o be honest, I smoked a joint." The accused was 
arrested for possessing  marijuana, read his rights and 
the car was searched. A hidden compartment at the 
base of the gearshift was searched and crack 
cocaine, fresh marijuana and a loaded handgun was 
discovered in it.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
At trial the lead officer testified that the 
car would not have been stopped but for 
the CPIC “Caution”. However, he also 
said that under s. 216(1) of Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act (HTA) he could only ask the 
driver for his driver's licence, proof of ownership 
and insurance documentation, and that he did not 
intend to go beyond that authority. Police also said 
that the smoking  of a joint could not account for the 
smell of marihuana that was detected since the 
odour was of fresh, rather than burned, marihuana. 
Plus, the accused did not appear impaired nor was 
there any smoking  paraphernalia noticed. The trial 
judge believed the officers, finding  them to be “very 
candid, credible and reliable witnesses.”  
The judge concluded that the police had HTA-
related reasons for pulling  the car over. The stop was 
not a ruse such that its arbitrariness could not be 
saved by s. 1 of the Charter. “They intended to check 
the driver's licence, ownership and insurance 
documentation and did so,” said the judge. “They 
did not, at the time they stopped the car, intend to 
search the car or to do anything  beyond the scope of 
their authority pursuant to the HTA. They had, in my 
view, the requisite subjective motivation.” Hence, 
the presence of a dual HTA/criminal investigatory 
purpose did not invalidate the lawfulness of the stop. 
The strong  smell of fresh marihuana then provided 
reasonable grounds for the accused’s arrest and the 
search that followed was proper as an incident of 
that arrest. Although there were no s. 9 (arbitrary 
detention) or s. 8 (unreasonable search) Charter 
breaches, the judge did find a s. 10(b) violation 
when the police failed to inform the accused of his 
right to counsel and asked questions about drugs 
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when they had reasonable grounds for arrest. This 
breach was described as relatively minor and did 
not warrant the exclusion of evidence. The accused 
was convicted of several firearms related offences 
and sentenced to 50 months in prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the trial 
judge’s finding  that police had a 
valid HTA reason to stop his car. In 
his view, the asserted HTA purpose 
to check documents was merely a pretext for an 
unauthorized stop and search for evidence of 
criminal activity. He also argued that the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to believe that he 
possessed marijuana. 
The Stop
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge accepted 
the evidence of the police officers and did not err in 
holding  that a legitimate criminal investigatory 
police interest beyond highway safety concerns did 
not taint the lawfulness of the stop as long  as the 
police did not infringe upon the accused’s liberty or 
security interests beyond what s. 216(1) permitted. It 
stated:
In her careful reasons, the trial judge found as a 
fact that the police officers had a dual purpose 
in stopping  the [accused’s] vehicle.They 
candidly admitted that the reason they stopped 
the [accused] was that a CPIC check of the 
licence plate number produced a “caution” in 
relation to the registered owner, followed by 
“armed and dangerous”, “violent”, and 
“domestic violence”. The lead officer testified 
that he wanted to ver i fy the dr iver ’s 
documentation pursuant to the HTA. Both 
officers testified that they understood that they 
were under constraints in conducting  such a 
stop and that if the HTA documents were in 
order, they would have to allow the [accused] to 
go on his way.
... She concluded that the officers had a valid 
HTA-related reason for stopping  the car, that 
their intention was to check the driver’s licence, 
ownership and insurance documentation, and 
that at the time they stopped the car they did not 
intend to search it or do anything beyond what 
was permitted by the HTA. The trial judge further 
found that this remained their intention until the 
point at which they detected the odour of fresh 
marijuana emanating from the car. ... [paras. 
5-6]
Here, it was open to the trial judge to find that the 
stop remained lawful for regulatory purposes despite 
the additional criminal investigative interest.
The Arrest
The trial judge found that the smell of fresh 
marihuana provided reasonable grounds to arrest 
the accused and search him and the vehicle as an 
incident of the arrest. Although previous court cases 
have cautioned against placing  undue reliance upon 
“smell” evidence, the Court of Appeal noted that 
“there is no legal barrier to the use of such 
evidence.” The trial judge’s conclusion that the arrest 
was lawful and the search that followed reasonable 
was upheld. 
s. 10(b) Charter
The Court of Appeal agreed that the breach of s. 
10(b) was relatively minor and that there was no 
nexus between it and the discovery of the evidence. 
Furthermore, the Crown did not rely on anything 
said by the accused to justify the search. The trial 
judge properly considered the s. 24(2) admissibility 
factors in concluding  that the evidence should be 
admitted.
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed.
Editor’s note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Morris, 2011 ONSC 5142
Note-able Quote
“The challenge of leadership is to be strong, but not 
rude; be kind, but not weak; be bold, but not bully; 
be thoughtful, but not lazy; be humble, but not 
timid; be proud, but not arrogant; have humor, but 
without folly.” - Jim Rohn
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SUPREME COURT TAKES 
LONGER TO DECIDE CASES 
In the “Supreme Court of Canada - Statistics 2002 to 
2012” the workload of Canada’s highest Court was 
reported. In 2012 the Supreme Court heard 78 
appeals, up from 70 in 2011 and 65 in 2010. The 
most appeals heard in the last 10 years was in 2005 
when 93 were brought before the Court. The lowest 
number of appeals heard in a single year during  the 
last decade was 53 in 2007.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date it hears a the case rose slightly to 6.3 
months from 6.2 months in 2011. Overall it takes 
18.7 months, on average, for the court to render an 
opinion from the time an application for leave to 
hear a case is filed. This is down slightly from the 
previous year (19.0 months). The shortest time 
within the last 10 years for the Court to announce its 
decision after hearing  arguments was 4.0 months in 
2004 while the longest time was 7.7 months in 
2010. 
Applications for Leave 
In 2012 there were 557 applications for leave to 
appeal a decision of a lower court, meaning  a party 
sought permission for a case to be heard from a 
three judge panel. Ontario was the source of most 
applications for leave at 156 cases. This was 
followed by Quebec (150), British Columbia (70), 
the Federal Court of Appeal (64), Alberta (46), 
Saskatchewan (19), Nova Scotia (16), New 
Brunswick (14), Manitoba (10) Newfoundland and 
Labrador (6), Prince Edward Island (5) and the 
Northwest Territories (1). No applications for leave 
came from Nunavut or the Yukon. Of the 557 leave 
applications, 65 or 12% were granted while 47 were 
pending. Of all applications for leave, 28% were 
criminal and 72% were civil.
Appeals Heard 
Of the 78  appeals heard in 2012, Ontario had the 
most of any origin at 24. This was followed by 
Quebec with 15 and British Columbia (14), the 
Federal Court of Appeal (10), Alberta (4), Nova 
Scotia (4), Manitoba (3), New Brunswick (2) and 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador , 
each with one. No appeals originated from New 
Brunswick, Northwest Territories, Prince Edward 
Island, Yukon or Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2012, 50% 
were civil while the remaining  50% 
were criminal. Ten percent (10%) of 
the criminal cases dealt with 
Charter issues, down slightly from 
12% in 2011. 
Fifteen (15) of the appeals heard in 2012 were as of 
right. This source of appeal includes cases where 
there is a dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. 
The remaining 63 cases had leave to appeal granted. 
Appeal Judgments 
There were 83 appeal judgments released in 2012, 
up from 71 the previous year. Only eight decisions 
last year were delivered from the bench while the 
remaining  75 were delivered after being  reserved. 
Thirty-one (31) appeals were allowed while 52 were 
dismissed. In terms of unanimity, 
the Court agreed on 72% of its 
cases. This is down slightly from 
75% the previous year. For the 
remaining  28% of  judgments 
released in 2012 the Court was 
split.  
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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SHIFT IN INTERVIEW JEOPARDY 
REQUIRES NEW ADVISEMENT OF 
RIGHTS
R. v. D.T., 2013 ONCA 166
The 16-year-old accused was 
arrested by police in the early 
morning  hours after he was stopped 
driving  a car that he admitted was 
stolen. Three other youths were 
arrested in a second stolen vehicle nearby. The 
accused was read his right to counsel and young 
person’s warning. He was transported to the police 
station where a second officer prepared to take a 
videotaped statement from him. She advised him of 
his right to counsel, his right to consult a parent or 
other adult, his right to say nothing, and his right to 
have a parent present when making  a statement. The 
accused confirmed that he understood, said he did 
not want his mother present during  the interview 
and that he wanted to make a statement. At the 
beginning  of the interview the accused was advised 
that he was charged with possession of stolen 
property under $5,000. Most of the interview 
focussed on the two stolen cars and the accused 
admitted his role in their thefts. Near the end of the 
interview, he was asked questions about the contents 
of the stolen cars. As these questions progressed, he 
admitted that he had broken into a private home, 
stole marijuana from a freezer and intended to sell 
it. The accused was subsequently charged with 
stealing  two vehicles, break and enter, the theft of 
marijuana and possessing  it for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused sought to have his statement 
made to police excluded because, it was 
suggested, he was not given a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right to retain 
and instruct counsel and to have a parent present, 
without delay, in privacy, without interruption; was 
not fully and properly informed and in a timely 
fashion of all of his rights with respect to retaining 
and instructing  counsel, in order to afford him a full 
understanding  of his rights; and was required to 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 146 Youth Criminal Justice Act
...
(2)  No oral  or written statement made by a 
young  person who is less  than eighteen years 
old,  to a peace officer or to any other person 
who is, in law, a person in authority, on the 
arrest or detention of the young  person or in 
circumstances where the peace officer or other person has 
reasonable  grounds for believing  that the young  person has 
committed  an offence is admissible against the young 
person unless
(a) the statement was voluntary;
(b)  the person to whom the statement was made has, 
before the statement  was made, clearly explained to the 
young  person, in language appropriate to his or her age 
and understanding, that
(i)  the young  person is  under no obligation to make a 
statement,
(ii)  any statement made by the young  person may be 
used as evidence in proceedings against him or her,
(iii)  the young  person has the right to consult  counsel 
and  a parent or other person in accordance with 
paragraph (c), and
(iv) any statement made by the young  person is required 
to be made in the presence of counsel and any other 
person consulted in accordance with paragraph (c), if 
any, unless the young person desires otherwise;
(c)  the young  person has, before the statement was made, 
been given a reasonable opportunity to consult
(i) with counsel, and
(ii) with a parent or,  in the absence of a parent, an adult 
relative or, in the absence of a parent and an adult   
relative, any other appropriate adult chosen by the young 
person, as long  as that person is not a co-accused, or 
under investigation, in respect of the same offence; and
(d)  if the young  person consults a person in accordance 
with paragraph (c), the young  person has been given a 
reasonable             opportunity to make the statement in the 
presence of that person.
...
(4) A young  person may waive the rights under paragraph 
(2)(c) or (d) but any such waiver
(a) must be recorded on video tape or audio tape; or
(b)  must be in writing  and contain a statement  signed  by 
the young  person that he or she has been informed  of the 
right being waived.
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provide information or evidence to incriminate 
himself prior to being  able to exercise his 
opportunity to consult counsel.
The judge, however, ruled the statement admissible. 
He found that the accused’s rights were complied 
with in each and every fashion, that he understood 
those rights and was given a number of opportunities 
to contact counsel, but declined. He also fully 
understood that he could have his mother or another 
adult present, but again declined. Furthermore, the 
judge held that the accused had a full operating 
mind, was aware of his right to remain silent and 
nonetheless he chose to give a statement. The 
accused was convicted of break and enter, 
possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and theft under $5,000. He was sentenced to 
probation for 18 months.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
admitting  his statement because 
police did not comply with s. 146 
of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) (the caution 
given to police was insufficient). He also argued his 
s. 10(b) Charter right was breached because of the 
increased jeopardy he faced. He suggested that 
during  his statement a further caution was required 
once he started to speak about additional offences 
that were not the subject of the original police 
investigation.
Under s. 146 of the YCJA there are a number of 
requirements for the admissibility of a statement by a 
young person. Justice MacPherson stated:
These requirements incorporate common law 
voluntariness and Charter s. 10(b) protections, in 
addition to special protections for young persons, 
such as the rights to have counsel present, to 
consult a parent, and to have a parent present when 
making  a statement. These are ... “a complimentary 
set of enhanced procedural safeguards... which 
governs the admissibility of statements made to 
persons in authority by young persons who are 
accused of committing offences.” Compliance with 
these safeguards must be established on the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[references omitted, para. 18]
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the officer 
“demonstrated model compliance with her 
obligations under s. 10(b) of the Charter and ss. 
146(2) and (4) of the YCJA” and the statement was 
not inadmissible on this basis:
[The officer] advised the [accused] of his right to 
counsel, his right to consult with his mother, his 
right to say nothing, and his right to have his 
mother present during  the interview when 
making  a statement. Because the [accused’s] 
mother was present in the police station, [the 
officer] took special care to ensure that the 
[accused] understood her availability for 
consultation and support if the [accused] so 
desired.
[The officer] also complied with the requirement 
that police officers both provide proper advice to 
young  people about their rights and make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the young 
person in fact understood those rights. After 
providing information about the various rights, 
[the officer] consistently asked simple follow-up 
questions that required the [accused] to respond 
in a way that demonstrated whether he 
understood his rights and his options. [reference 
omitted, paras. 19-20]
Change of Jeopardy
When the accused was interviewed the only charge 
recorded on the Statement of a Young  Person form 
and told to him was possession of stolen property 
under $5,000. The interview, for some time, then 
continued only with questions and answers about 
the two stolen vehicles. Near the end the interview, 
however, the officer began to ask questions about 
the contents of the cars. When she mentioned 
several iPods, the accused said he had stolen the 
black one from a house. The interview then 
continued for several minutes with questions being 
“[The accused’s] jeopardy changed noticeably. He started to talk about crimes that were both 
different and potentially more serious than that with which he had already been charged.”
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asked about the break in, the theft of the substantial 
quantity of marihuana from the house and his 
intention to sell it. 
The accused argued that when the interview shifted 
from the stolen vehicles to the break and enter of the 
home and theft of marijuana, his jeopardy increased, 
both quantitatively (more potential criminal charges) 
and qualitatively (more serious charges) such that 
the police were required to re-advise him of his 
rights.
The Court of Appeal agreed. Citing  an earlier 
decision, Justice MacPherson noted there are times 
where the police have a duty to re-advise a detainee 
of their rights during  an interview/statement. This 
occurs “if they want to ask questions that go beyond 
an exploratory stage in connection with a related but 
significantly more serious offence, or a different and 
unrelated offence. This obligation to re-advise 
applies even where, as here, the detainee brings up 
the other offences.” 
Furthermore, Justice MacPherson found that the 
enhanced procedural safeguards of s. 146 of the 
YCJA “strongly support a similar analytical 
framework.”
In my view ... the [accused’s] jeopardy changed 
noticeably. He started to talk about crimes that 
were both different and potentially more serious 
than that with which he had already been 
charged. In short order, he introduced, at a 
minimum, the following  crimes: break and enter 
of a private dwelling, theft of an iPod and 
marijuana, possession of marijuana, and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. Once 
all of this information was on the table, ... [the 
officer] had a duty to recognize that ... there was 
a real potential for the focus of the criminal 
investigation “to shift and broaden”. [para. 31]
Here, the officer continued to ask questions that 
“went well beyond being  exploratory; they were 
patently investigatory.” She questioned the accused 
on details about the break and enter, theft of the 
marijuana and the reason for stealing  it (to sell it). 
The officer should have stopped the interview, 
carefully re-advised the accused of his rights under 
s. 10 of the Charter and s. 146(2) of the YCJA, 
ensured again that he understood his rights and 
properly waived them. Then, if the accused still 
wanted to make a statement, the officer could 
question him about these new and more serious 
offences. SInce this did not occur, the portions of the 
accused’s statement related to the break and enter 
and theft of marihuana were excluded. His 
convictions for break and enter and possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking  were set 
aside and a new trial was ordered on these charges. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reiterating Right To Counsel
“Consider ing the pur pose 
underlying s. 10(b) and its 
fundamental importance in 
maintaining the fairness of the 
criminal investigatory process, I think it is 
appropriate to decide close cases in favour of 
the reiteration of the s. 10(b) rights. The police 
should be encouraged to readvise detainees of 
the right to counsel when the focus of an 
investigation begins to shift or broaden. The 
administration of criminal justice is better 
served by a restatement of the detainee’s s. 
10(b) rights which is a little early than one 
which is too late to serve its intended purpose. 
Once the police have a realistic indication that 
a detainee may incriminate herself in a 
different and unrelated offence, the police 
should, if they wish to pursue that area of 
investigation, reiterate the detainee’s right to 
counsel and connect that right to the new 
allegations.” - Ontario Court of Appeal Justice 
Doherty in R. v. Sawatsky (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 767.
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OFFICER HAD SUBJECTIVE/
OBJECTIVE GROUNDS TO OPEN 
BAG INCIDENTAL TO DETENTION
R. v. Shaw, 2013 ONCA 37
At 3:45 am police received a 911 call 
f rom an apar tment ’s res ident 
reporting  gun shots in the building. 
There was no description of any 
suspects . Two pol ice o f f icers 
immediately attended the lobby, but there was no 
one else present. Shortly thereafter, the accused 
crounded a corner in the lobby. He appeared 
startled, moved to turn away and put his hands in his 
pockets. The officers asked him some questions 
about where he was coming  from and what he was 
doing, but were not satisfied by the answers given 
and thought the accused was being  evasive. His 
answers were vague, he smelled of alcohol and 
confirmed he did not live in the building. He was 
fidgeting  with his jacket, his hands reaching  in and 
out of his pockets. A sergeant also arrived on scene 
to assist. All three officers were concerned that the 
accused may have been involved in the reported gun 
shots and that he may be armed. When the accused 
turned away and reached toward his right pocket, 
the officers responded instantaneously, one grabbing 
his right wrist and one grabbing his right hand. 
When the accused’s hand emerged from his pocket, 
he was holding  something  black. The object, an 
opaque pouch with a zipper, measured about three 
to four inches by three to four inches and contained 
something  hard and round, approximately the size 
of a golf ball. The officer who opened it thought the 
bag  may still contain a weapon, although not one of 
traditional form or size. The sergeant believed that 
until the bag  was opened, he could not rule out the 
possibility of a weapon being  inside. The third 
officer testified that once the pouch was exposed it 
was clear that it was not a gun, but that it may be 
drugs. The bag  contained a solid rock of cocaine 
weighing  20 grams. The accused tried to grab the 
drugs and resist his arrest for possessing  it. He was 
taken into custody and also had money, two 
cellphones and keys that led to the discovery of a 
prohibited loaded semi automatic gun in his vehicle. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The trial judge found that the police, in 
all of the circumstances, had reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused before he 
turned away and reached toward his 
pocket. When the officers observed him make a 
move to turn away and simultaneously reach toward 
his right pocket, they thought he was going  for a gun 
and physically restrained him by grabbing  his right 
forearm and hand. The judge concluded this 
physical detention was entirely appropriate. It was 
both objectively and subjectively justified and was 
not arbitrary. As for the search, the judge found the 
police were entitled to open the bag  and were not 
obliged to return it to the accused unopened. Two 
officers - the one holding  the bag  and the sergeant - 
testified that until the black bag  was opened, they 
could not rule out the possibility that it contained a 
weapon. Another officer not holding  the bag  stated 
that as soon as he saw the bag  he knew it was not a 
weapon. “I accept the evidence of [the officer], who 
was holding  the bag, that until he looked inside, he 
was not satisfied that it did not contain a weapon,” 
said the judge. “Although the small bag  could not 
contain a traditional gun as we know it, it was 
reasonable to open the bag  to ensure it did not 
contain a weapon.” The evidence was admitted and 
the accused was convicted by a jury.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the police 
did not have reasonable grounds to 
open the black bag  and their pat-
down search went beyond what an 
investigative detention authorizes.  In his view, a pat 
down search may have been justified but when the 
bag  was seized it should not have been opened. 
Thus, its searchwas unreasonable. The Court of 
Appeal, however, disagreed. The trial judge accepted 
the seizing  officer’s evidence and found he had, both 
subjectively and objectively, reasonable grounds to 
open the bag  because of a concern it may have 
contained a weapon.  The accused’s appeal against 
his conviction was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Shaw, 2010 ONSC 282.
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Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
